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Organizational Decline and Fiscal Distress
in Municipal Police Agencies
Abstract
In late 2007, the United States entered one of the most significant recessions in recent memory.
While the consequences to individuals have been well-documented, less attention has been paid
to the effects on state-sponsored organizations such as police agencies. The current study
examines fiscal distress (e.g., layoffs, hiring freezes) in a sample of large municipal law
enforcement agencies. According to a framework proposed by Levine (1978), departments
should be most vulnerable to fiscal distress when the jurisdiction experiences economic shocks
(environmental entropy), the demand for police services declines (problem depletion), the
political system becomes less supportive of police agencies (political vulnerability), and the
organization becomes more structurally complex (organizational atrophy). Structural equation
modeling results suggest that fiscal distress is driven by the local economic context, changing
crime rates, and organizational size. This research has implications for helping organizations
address future economic declines.

Keywords: policing, organizational theory, fiscal distress, recession, cutback management
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Organizational Decline and Fiscal Distress
in Municipal Police Agencies
The general health of the United States economy ebbs and flows over time. According to
the National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. suffered through 33 separate recessions
between 1857 and 2010 (2012). The cyclical nature of the economy suggests that economic
distress for individuals and organizations is inevitable, with contraction occurring approximately
every 17 years and, in recent decades, even more frequently. The recent recession, the most
substantial economic decline since the Great Depression, began in December 2007 and officially
lasted 18 months. Effects typically extend beyond the official period identified by economists as
characterizing the recession. By late 2009, unemployment rates soared above 10 percent, more
than twice the level from only a decade earlier, and would remain above 8 percent until 2012
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). Not only did millions of Americans lose their jobs, they lost
their homes and retirement savings as well. Similarly, many businesses were forced to either
scale back or cease operations entirely.
The effects of the Great Recession also permeated the public sector. Cities and towns
struggled to maintain funding for municipal services as property and sales tax revenues declined
due to diminished home prices and decreased spending, respectively, and federal grant support
dried up because of national austerity measures (Parlow, 2012). The Brookings Institution
estimated a loss of nearly 600,000 government jobs between 2009 and 2011, including teachers,
first responders, air-traffic controllers, and other workers (Greenstone & Looney, 2012). Police
departments were not immune from the turbulent economic environment. One estimate placed
the number of law enforcement jobs lost at 10,000 positions (Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2011). Some local agencies were, quite simply, decimated by layoffs and
furloughs. The Newark, New Jersey Police Department, for example, faced a nearly $17 million
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shortfall in 2010, necessitating the layoffs of 167 of the city’s sworn officers (Queally &
Friedman, 2010). In Camden, New Jersey, layoffs cut the city’s department from 367 to 204 in
2010; the department would disband entirely several years later in place of a county force
(Goldstein, 2011). Other agencies cut overtime spending or curtailed salary increases for agency
personnel (Police Executive Research Forum, 2010). Nearly half of all agencies in a Police
Executive Research Forum survey indicated that “services in their community have declined or
will decline due to budget cuts” (p. 2).
Based on these accounts, the recession thrusted certain law enforcement agencies into a
period of organizational decline marked by declining budgets, resource scarcity, cutbacks, and
financial constraints (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987; Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987; Guy,
1989). For some department leaders, workforce reductions are likely to be viewed as temporary
challenges dictated by extraordinary economic circumstances (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). For
others, the turbulent economic environment may have produced long-term organizational
resource declines and a belief that funding levels will never return to pre-recession levels
(Druker & Robinson, 1994). Indeed, the downturn led the Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services (2011) to conclude, “Rather than continuing to provide services through
traditional means in hope that the economy will return to pre-recession levels, police nationwide
are shifting, adapting, and redeveloping the ways in which they do their job—to ensure the
highest levels of public safety” (p. 34).
It is clear the recession adversely affected some police agencies, but not all agencies felt
the pains of the poor economy equally. What factors account for organizational decline within
municipal police agencies? Levine (1978, 1979) argued that a combination of organizational and
environmental characteristics contributes to fiscal problems: environmental entropy, problem
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depletion, political vulnerability, and organizational atrophy. Specifically, Levine suggested that
organizations are most susceptible to decline due to economic shocks, a declining need for the
agency’s services, lack of political and community support, and organizational structures that
hinder adaptation and innovation.
The current research examines organizational decline among police agencies. Some
avoided deep fiscal strains, thereby escaping the detrimental outcomes often associated with
decline such as innovation, employee morale, and turnover problems. To date, researchers have
tended to focus only on the outcomes of recessions for police agencies and the specific cutback
strategies used to deal with budgetary problems. They have not attempted to explain the causes
of the decline in the first place using economic, environmental context, and organizational
variables. Drawing upon Levine’s (1978) framework, we argue that less complex agencies with
a well-defined community need, strong political/community support, and a stable economic
environment should be able to avoid organizational decline better than other agencies.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Organizational Decline
Municipal government entities are often taken for granted, viewed as impervious to
outside shocks (Adam et al., 2007; Lewis, 2002). It is not until threats to their existence emerge
that we acknowledge their vulnerability. For some scholars, these periods of crises and declines
are part of an overall life cycle view of organizations, a framework which emphasizes various
events and turning points that alter organizational trajectories (see, for example, Cameron &
Whetten, 1983; Kimberly, 1980; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; van de Ven & Poole, 1995). This
research focused attention on a variety of points within an organization’s history, most notably
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its creation and its death or disbanding (King, 2009). Although most large police organizations
in the U.S. were formed in the late 1800s or early 1900s, they may differ in their structures and
activities due to imprinting caused by the specific time period of their founding (King, 2009).
For instance, pre-1900s departments (political era organizations) were less likely to employ
civilians than younger (reform era) departments (King, 1999). Life cycle research has also
identified factors associated with police department disbanding, including lack of funding,
internal crises, and small size (Kiedrowski, Jones, & Ruddell, 2017; King, 2014).
Just as important as organizational creation and death is organizational decline, periods
that may alternate with growth and stagnation or represent the beginnings of a more permanent
descent toward failure and disbanding. The conceptual definition of decline is murky, including
everything from decreasing organizational size (e.g., number of employees) to declining
financial resources (e.g., budgets, profits) to diminished views of the organization (e.g., prestige,
reputation) (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987; Guy, 1989; King, 2009; Weitzel & Jonsson,
1989). Regardless of the specific indicator, there is a consensus about its dysfunction. It has
been associated with organizational conflict, lack of innovation, negative structural changes,
diminished employee participation, and declining morale (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987;
King, 2009; Levine, 1978).
In his classic work in the field, Levine (1978) adopted what has become a commonplace
definition of organizational decline—a decrease in an organization’s financial resources (see also
Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987; Whetten, 1987). Organizations which do not have the
resources necessary to perform their basic roles are potentially faced with organizational decline.
It is these organizations which fail to adapt that are in danger of permanent demise. While
economic downturns can account for organizational decline, many organizations do not struggle

Organizational Decline 7

during adverse economic cycles. Similarly, many organizations struggle even in periods of
external economic stability. To understand the path toward organizational decline, Levine
(1978) presented a typology which accounts for the locus (internal/external) and the nature
(political/economic) of the decline.

Environmental Entropy
According to Levine (1978), environmental entropy represents an external economic
cause of organizational decline where “the capacity of the environment to support the public
organization at prevailing levels of activity erodes” (p. 318). He writes broadly of the
detrimental effects of local population declines, supply costs and scarcity (detrimental to
manufacturers), and overall market conditions. Environmental entropy could occur due to crises,
such as local plant closings or economic recessions (see Brunet, 2015). During periods of
economic decline, unemployment rates are likely to rise and tax revenues fall. This reduces the
resources that the government can spend on public organizations, such as police agencies. For
many agencies, this necessitates decline and restructuring, but for some agencies, it could signal
the end.
Variations in organizational decline within police agencies during the Great Recession
may be explained by the localized nature of the recession’s effects. The Great Recession
disproportionately affected certain parts of the country and, consequently, individuals,
businesses, and government agencies within these areas. For instance, poverty rates increased
most dramatically during the recession in certain cities in Florida and California (Kneebone,
2010); other cities (e.g., Washington, D.C.) were somewhat insulated from its effects. Location
may provide some measure of protection from broader economic forces.
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Problem Depletion
Problem depletion, an external political cause of decline, represents a scenario where the
demand for a public organization’s service deteriorates (Levine, 1978). Although the supply of
crime is generally constant, if crimes rates were to diminish to the point where formal social
control was no longer necessary from a police agency, then the health of the agency could
decline or even cease to exist. There is some evidence linking crime rates to police
organizational size (see Maguire, 2001 for a review), but the few studies of organizational
decline in policing point to the limited relevance of crime. In fact, King (2014) and Brunet
(2015) found that many of the disbanded agencies in their Ohio and North Carolina samples,
respectively, failed to report crime data to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting program. Without
any internal records, these agencies likely failed for reasons other than problem depletion.
Where crime data were available, they varied widely, leading the authors to conclude that they
played little role in the agency termination process. That said, crime did significantly affect at
least two jurisdictions’ decisions to disband. According to Brunet (2015), “one chief convinced
the town council to do away with the department as there was little crime at the time [and] at
least one interviewee noted that rising crime levels convinced tow leaders of the need to shift
policing responsibilities to the better equipped and trained sheriff’s office” (p. 331).

Political Vulnerability
Levine (1978) identified political vulnerability as an internal risk factor that made
organizations susceptible to budget changes and demands from external providers. For instance,
younger organizations are more likely to struggle, a phenomenon known as the liability of
newness (Brunet, 2015; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). Smaller organizations are also
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particularly vulnerable. As King (2014) noted, “It is relatively easy for sovereigns [e.g., local
governments] to penetrate the skin of small police agencies because there is little to buffer the
organization from external intrusion” (p. 686). Among the 19 disbanded North Carolina
departments in Brunet’s (2015) sample, all had 10 or fewer officers. Organizations also risk
decline if they are heavily reliant upon single external resource providers; diversifying resource
flows provides some buffer against external control (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
A city’s government form may also increase the likelihood of organizational decline.
Elected mayors are more likely to respond to constituent demands, including demands for crime
control services, leaving police departments vulnerable to external pressures (Stucky, 2003,
2005; Wilson & Boland, 1978). The city manager-council form of government is envisioned as
superior to the mayor-council form, removing the political (re-election) motive from budgetary
decisions. Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981) suggested that the city manager-council form
allows for “centralized control over budget and personnel” in the hands of a professional
decision-maker (p. 620). Consequently, they predicted that city managers are better positioned
to manage government agencies in times of fiscal uncertainty, thereby averting organizational
decline. Morabito (2008) also found that the centralized decision-making power of a city
manager facilitates innovation; a mayor must contend with the dissent and conflict arising from a
more diffused set of constituents. She found that police agencies operating in city managercouncil jurisdictions were more likely to adopt community policing. These benefits
notwithstanding, other researchers have noted the benefits of a mayor form of government.
Stucky (2005), for instance, found that traditional governments (e.g., mayor-councils, partisan
elections, and district-based elections) employed more police officers than reformed
governments (e.g., city managers, non-partisan elections, and at-large elections). This is
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predicated on the belief that elected politicians must remain responsive to constituents and are
less likely to allow police organizations to decline in size against public demands. Others predict
that city managers are cost conscious and, all else being equal, would restrict public agency
expenditures. Yet, empirical research more commonly shows no effect of government form on
expenditures (see, for example, MacDonald, 2008). As such, the precise relationship between
government form and organizational decline, if any, is still unclear.
Community support is related to organizational decline for many of the same reasons as
government form. If mayors feed organizations by responding to constituents, organizations can
resist decline and attempts to disband the agency by maintaining a coalition of community
support (Kaufman, 1976). The community becomes a lobbying voice for growth or maintenance
of organizational resources and functioning.
Another way to foster community support and make police agencies more politically
stable is by employing community-oriented policing strategies. Community-oriented policing
became popular in the 1990s and reflected a move toward policing that incorporate citizen input,
a broad policing function, personalized service, geographic focus, positive interactions, and
partnerships within the community (see Cordner, 2015). Police agencies that employ this style
of policing may be more likely to receive community support, thus making them less vulnerable
to decline. According to a systematic review of the community policing literature, 78.3 percent
of the studies reviewed found that community-oriented policing strategies have a beneficial
effect on citizen satisfaction, and 60 percent found beneficial effects for police legitimacy (see
Gill et al., 2014).
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Organizational Atrophy
Levine (1978) identified organizational atrophy as a fourth cause of organizational
decline (internal and technical). Organizational atrophy could occur with a large number of
retirements, and the agency lacking the staff available to effectively police the community.
Moreover, agencies with high levels of corruption or police misconduct could also face decline,
particularly if such misconduct was met with public resistance (see King, 2014). Similarly, poor
performance can also be linked to decline, as both unsatisfactory performance and misconduct
are often linked to legitimacy concerns. In addition to these factors, the organizational structure
of police agencies could contribute to decline (see Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003). In
particular, agencies that are too complex (e.g., too much differentiation) and taking on too many
roles (e.g., task scope is too large) could face decline. Although the organizational literature
suggests that some organizational characteristics (e.g., specialization through the presence of
experts) may facilitate innovation, others are impediments (e.g., formalization removing
discretion and innovation) (see Damanpour, 1991). In periods of distress or when operating in
dynamic environments, mechanistic or bureaucratic organizations may be slow to change and
suffer accordingly (see Burns & Stalker, 1961). Moreover, complex organizations that use
resources more effectively tend to have fewer slack resources, and cutbacks hit these
organizations particularly hard (see Levine, 1979; Scorsone & Plerhoples, 2010).

Cutback Management
When faced with decline, public service organizations (e.g., police agencies) face tough
decisions. It is inevitable that when resources become scarce, organizations must adapt to these
conditions, whether they are temporary or permanent. This process of “managing organizational
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change toward lower levels of resource consumption and organization activity” is defined as
cutback management (Levine, 1979, p. 180). According to Greenhalgh, Lawrence, and Sutton
(1988), these strategies lie along a continuum related to the protection of employee well-being.
For example, hiring freezes preclude the replacement of department employees or the
employment of new workers, but the financial well-being of existing workers is maintained.
Overtime and salary reductions more deeply affect existing employees, first by restricting
opportunities for extra pay and then by reducing base compensation. Furloughs and layoffs
differ only in their permanence. The point is that organizations tend to respond to decline
through “a reduction of personnel, output, equipment, or services” (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989, p.
95).

Current Study
In this article, we use Levine’s typology to examine whether environmental and
organizational characteristics of police agencies contribute to organizational decline. Few prior
empirical studies have addressed this question. To be sure, we know that some police
organizations suffered during the Great Recession, experiencing furloughs, layoffs, reductions in
training, discontinued units, and other cutbacks (Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, 2011). Unclear is whether the recession alone was responsible for this organizational
decline and whether local economic conditions affected agencies differently. This study is
important because it has implications regarding how police agencies can perform their goals
efficiently, even in the face of harsh economic circumstances, declining need, political and
community pressures, and internal challenges. We now turn to a discussion of the data and
measures used to answer our research question.
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METHODOLOGY
Sample
To examine Levine’s hypotheses, we merged together data from multiple archival and
official sources. We used the 2013 wave of the Law Enforcement Management and
Administrative Statistics Survey (LEMAS) as the study’s sampling frame (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2015). The Bureau of Justice Statistics has administered the LEMAS survey to a
sample of law enforcement agencies at irregular intervals of one to six years since 1987.
Although the composition of the LEMAS sample varies across waves—for instance, special
purpose agencies were included in 1997 but omitted in 2003—municipal, sheriff, and state police
agencies with 100 or more full-time sworn officers are included each year (Groves & Cork,
2009). The remainder of the LEMAS sample is composed of a selection of smaller (<100 FT
sworn officers) agencies. Given the wealth of organizational data (e.g., personnel, organizational
structures, equipment) collected via the LEMAS survey from a large sample (over 2,500) of
agencies with response rates exceeding 90 percent, the archived LEMAS datasets have proven to
be valuable tools for police researchers (Groves & Cork, 2009; Langworthy, 2002; Matusiak,
Campbell, & King, 2014). In fact, a recent study identified LEMAS as the second most used
dataset produced by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, trailing only the National Crime
Victimization Survey (Matusiak, Campbell, & King, 2014).

Data Sources
The 2013 LEMAS administration was the first administration since the Great Recession
and the first wave to ask about organizational responses to fiscal crises. The 2,826 state, county,
and local agencies within the dataset were filtered to include only municipal agencies employing
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100 or more full-time officers (n=509). Data considerations forced us to restrict the sample to
only larger local agencies. Several hypothesized predictors of fiscal distress were only available
for metropolitan areas (e.g., gross domestic product) and/or municipal governments (e.g.,
government form), necessitating the exclusion of state, county, and sheriff’s departments.
Additionally, sheriff departments are politically, economically, and functionally distinct from
most municipal agencies, further justifying the restricted sample. We also omitted smaller
agencies (<100 FT sworn officers). The 2013 LEMAS survey was merged with the earlier 2007
wave to establish the time ordering of variable relationships. Since the Bureau of Justice
Statistics samples all large law enforcement agencies during each administration, over 90 percent
(n=465) of 2013 large agencies also participated in 2007. The sample of overlapping agencies
with fewer than 100 full-time sworn officers was considerably smaller and unrepresentative of
the population of smaller agencies. Thus, the present study sample included 465 large (100 or
more FT sworn officers) municipal agencies responding to both the 2007 and 2013 waves of the
LEMAS survey.
In addition to the LEMAS surveys from 2007 and 2013, we utilize data from multiple
sources to examine environmental indicators of fiscal distress. These data come from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, the American Community Survey (2007 & 2011), the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2011), the Uniform Crime Reports (2007 & 2011), and the Municipal Year Book
(2010). The measures extracted from these data sets are discussed in greater detail throughout
the methodology section.
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Dependent Variables
Fiscal distress, a latent construct, served as the study’s dependent variable. The LEMAS
survey addressed departmental fiscal challenges, including cutback management strategies, for
the first time during the 2013 administration. LEMAS respondents reported the presence of
salary reductions, furloughs, hiring freezes, and layoffs in agencies during the period January 1,
2010 and December 31, 2012 (exception was for layoffs, which referenced 2012 only). These
cutback management strategies served as a proxy for organizational decline given the empirically
established connection between decline and cutback management strategies (see, for instance,
Levine, 1978). We employ the label “fiscal distress” instead of organizational decline to signify
a deeper level of decline; organizations are not just facing budget reductions, but are forced to
make significant adjustments to staffing. For study purposes, we make no distinction between
strategies affecting only sworn or only non-sworn employees1 nor do we examine the depth or
magnitude of the fiscal distress (e.g., the percent reduction in salaries). The four indicators
capture the existence of fiscal distress only.2

Independent Variables
As noted earlier, Levine (1978) identified four broad determinants of public
organizational decline (environmental entropy, problem depletion, political vulnerability, and
organizational atrophy). We constructed the independent variables included in the models below
with these broad categories in mind. Since economic recessions affect cities quite differently, we
employed Levine’s argument and hypothesize that police agency fiscal distress will be greatest
in jurisdictions characterized by weak economies or, in Levine’s words, a form of environmental
entropy. In these areas, local governments face more constraints in fully supporting public
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organizations. Environmental entropy was measured as a latent, unobserved construct. We
selected three indicators based on their ability to reflect the underlying construct; in other words,
variation in the environmental entropy construct, along with measurement error, is believed to
produce variation within each of the observed indicators (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). The first
indicator, gross domestic product (GDP), is a widely used measure of economic activity at the
national and subnational levels. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) collects and reports GDP data for U.S. metropolitan areas (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, n.d.). For each MSA, we computed the percent change in the gross domestic product
between 2007 and 2011 and subsequently attached each police agency in the LEMAS sample to
its respective MSA, providing an indication of growth, stagnation, or decline in regional (i.e.,
metropolitan) economic activity. The second observed economic indicator captured the percent
change in county-level median home values between 2007 and 2011. Change scores were
computed using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s (n.d.) American Community Survey.
Plummeting housing prices characterized the Great Recession and produced deleterious effects
on individuals (e.g., personal bankruptcies; homelessness) and communities (e.g., declining
housing values) (Ellen & Dastrup, 2012). A healthier economy is generally indicated by rising
home prices or, at the very least, greater stability in housing markets. Finally, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (based on Bureau of Labor Statistics
data) provided 2011 county-level employment rates.3 Employment rather than unemployment
rates were used for consistency in the direction of all three observed indicators; positive values
suggest a stronger local economy (greater GDP growth, growing home prices, and more workers
employed).
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Levine also argued that organizations become more susceptible to cutbacks when the
very problems they are created to address—their raison d’être—subside. In the case of police
organizations, declining crime rates may signal problem depletion, reducing the urgency to
sustain existing staffing levels. We measured this problem depletion by collecting Federal
Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting data for both 2007 and 2011 (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 2009, 2013) and computing the percent change in crime rates for each agency.
Only Part I crimes were included in the rate computation (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft).
Political vulnerability was measured by four variables capturing an agency’s exposure to
potential government, resource provider, and community pressures. The first measure captures
the size of the department in terms of full-time sworn personnel in 2007. Due to the significant
positive skew in the dataset, the organizational size variable was log transformed in all models
discussed in the analysis section. Second, government form indicated the legislative and
administrative structure for each city—council-manager, mayor-council, or other forms. There is
some belief that the council-manager form of government represents a more professional model,
where a city manager rather than a politicized mayor exerts business-like control over the
everyday operations of the community, including its finances (see, for example, Levine, Rubin,
& Wolohojian, 1981). If true, we would expect these professional governments to help police
departments avoid agency-level fiscal distress. Data on government forms were collected from
the Municipal Year Book, 2010, a publication of the International City/County Management
Association (2010). The Association classifies each city with at least 2,500 residents according
to its form of government: council-manager, commission, mayor-council, representative town
meeting, or town meeting. For the purposes of the current study, government form was
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dichotomized into 1=council-manager (the hypothesized professional form) or 0=other form.
Third, funding variety measures the diversity of sources from which police departments receive
operational funding. The variable was constructed by summing seven indicators from the 2013
LEMAS dataset—one or more municipal governments, one or more county governments, one or
more state government agencies, one or more federal government agencies, payment for
contracted law enforcement services, asset forfeiture programs, and user fees (Cronbach’s α=
0.700). Presumably agencies receiving funding through multiple sources are better positioned to
absorb shocks from any singular funding source. Fourth, a measure of community policing was
included in the models below based on the belief that departments practicing strategies
consisting with the philosophy may foster local community support. Consequently, agencies
may draw upon this political capital as a buffer in times of need, such as during threatened
cutbacks. The community policing variable was an index, constructed by summing nine
dichotomous items from the 2007 LEMAS survey—agency maintained a mission statement with
a community policing component, agency encouraged patrol officers to engage in problemsolving projects, agency conducted a citizens’ police academy, agency maintain a formal
community policing plan, agency gave patrol officers responsibility for specific geographic
beats, agency included collaborative problem-solving projects in officer evaluations, agency
upgraded technology to support analysis of community problems, agency partnered with citizen
groups, and agency conducted or sponsored community surveys (Cronbach’s α= 0.690).
Finally, organizational atrophy was measured by two variables. According to Levine’s
framework, organizational characteristics may hinder a department’s ability to adapt in the face
of financial crises, ultimately leading to cutbacks. This is especially true when organizations
become structurally complex and inflexible. Horizontal complexity, measured with 2007
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LEMAS data, represents an organization’s tendency to divide work into distinct divisions, units,
or other occupational sections. Respondents were asked whether 22 different problems and tasks
were handled with a full-time special unit, specially assigned personnel, on an as-needed basis,
or not at all.4 Responses were dichotomized into special unit (1) and other (0) and, consistent
with prior police organizational research, summed to create a horizontal complexity index
(Cronbach’s α= 0.832) with higher scores indicating greater levels of structural complexity (see
Maguire et al., 2003; Randol, 2012). The final variable, formalization, is a measure of structural
coordination or control (see Maguire, 2003). It reflects the procedural or rule-bound nature of an
organization. LEMAS 2007 respondents were asked about the presence of formal written
policies in 17 areas (1=agency has written policy/procedure, 0=agency lacks written policy
procedure).5 Responses were summed, creating a formalization scale (Cronbach’s α= 0.583)
with higher scores indicating greater reliance on organizational rules (see Maguire et al., 2003;
Randol, 2012).
Tables 1 and 2 display descriptive statistics for all study variables and correlations
between independent variables, respectively. Figure 1 depicts the theoretical model as well as
hypothesized relationships between constructs.

[Insert Table 1 About Here]
[Insert Table 2 About Here]

Analysis Procedures
Given that our measurement of Levine’s model includes both measurement (fiscal
distress and environmental entropy are measured as unobserved latent constructs) and structural
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(regression paths) components, it is most appropriately assessed using structural equation
modeling techniques. We follow the two-step modeling approach recommended by Anderson
and Gerbing (1988) and Schumacker and Lomax (2010) wherein the validity of the measurement
portion of the theoretical model is first established (in this case, fiscal distress and environmental
entropy) using confirmatory factor analysis before proceeding to an analysis of
structural/prediction models. All analyses were performed using Mplus, a powerful structural
software package. The program is particularly useful because it includes a model estimator
(weighed least squares means and variance adjusted, or WLSMV) to handle latent construct
indicators that violate assumptions of continuous normality (Muthén & Muthén, 2010). In the
present study, four dichotomous indicators measure fiscal distress, thereby necessitating the
alternative estimator.
The individual parameters within measurement (i.e., factor loadings) and structural
models (i.e., standardized coefficients) provide some indication of the importance of specific
model paths but do not provide any indication of the degree of congruence between the
hypothesized model (see Figure 1) and the data. We rely upon four of the many available
goodness-of-fit statistics developed over time to assess the overall model fit (Byrne, 2012; Gau,
2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kelloway, 2015; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The Chi Square Test
of Model Fit (χ2) is one of the most commonly reported statistics and tests the difference between
the sample covariance matrix and the more restricted covariance matrix based on the
hypothesized model (Byrne, 2012). A non-significant χ2 suggests model fit or no differences
between the two covariance matrices. Results must be interpreted cautiously, however, as the
test is sensitive to sample size, sometimes with as few as 200 cases (Gau, 2010; Hoelter, 1983;
Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Consequently, the Chi Square Test of Model Fit is evaluated
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along with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; values <0.06 indicate a good
fit), comparative fit index (CFS; values >0.95 indicate a good fit), and the Tucker-Lewis Index
(TLI; values >0.95 indicate a good fit). Following Hu and Bentler’s (1999) suggestion, we adopt
an approach whereby the indices are examined holistically; a slight deviation from
aforementioned cutoffs is acceptable if the bulk of the evidence points to a strong-fitting model.

FINDINGS
Measurement Models
Before proceeding with the full structural model, we first constructed a measurement
model inclusive of the two latent constructs—fiscal distress and economy—described earlier.
Individual factor loadings for each construct were examined (four for fiscal distress and three for
economy) and the overall fit of the model was assessed using common goodness of fit statistics.
As shown in Table 3, all fit statistics (χ2=10.387, df=13, p=0.662, RMSEA=0.000, CFI=1.000,
TLI=1.008) are well within the acceptable range suggesting that the hypothesized measurement
model fits the data well. Although factor loadings are lower (<0.40) for two of the four fiscal
distress measures (hiring freezes and layoffs), we decided to retain all four indicators due to their
theoretical relationship to the underlying concept and the overall model fit statistics.6

[Insert Table 3 About Here]

Structural Model
The next step involved testing the full structural model shown in Figure 1.7 Results are
displayed as Model 1 in Table 4. The model (inclusive of both measurement and structural
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components) fits the data according to goodness-of-fit statistics (χ2=73.898, df=55, p=0.045,
RMSEA=0.029, CFI=0.963, TLI=0.953). A review of individual parameters shows only partial
support for Levine’s (1978) arguments. As expected, the local economy (β= -0.544, p<0.001)
and crime rate change (β= -0.129, p<0.05) are both negatively related to fiscal distress within
large local municipal police agencies. Organizations are less likely to experience the detrimental
effects of the great recession if they operate within stronger local economic environments
characterized by higher employment rates, rising home values, and a stronger GDP. Similarly,
community need inoculates organizations from fiscal distress, even after accounting for the local
context. Large increases in serious crime rates between 2007 and 2011 also buffered
departments from major cutbacks. In contrast, drops in crime are associated with greater fiscal
distress. Among the four indicators of political vulnerability and two indicators of organizational
atrophy, only organizational size is significantly related to fiscal distress. Larger organizations
are more likely to experience some combination of salary reductions, furloughs, hiring freezes,
and layoffs. Overall, Model 1 accounts for approximately 45 percent of the variation in the fiscal
distress latent construct.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
[Insert Table 4 About Here]

We estimated a second model (see Model 2 in Table 4) based on software-produced
modification indices, suggestions for additional paths or constraints designed to improve overall
model fit (see Gau, 2010; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Adjusting models based on empirical
data should be done cautiously and with relevant theory in mind to avoid producing a strong-
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fitting model unable to be reproduced with different samples. Although Model 1 fit the data, we
added a single path based on the suggested modification index—a pathway connecting
government form with the unobserved latent economy construct. This allows us to estimate the
same parameters as in Model 1 but also examine the indirect relationship between government
form and police department fiscal distress through the local economy. The results in Table 4
show that there is only a slight improvement in overall model fit from Model 1 (χ2=60.811,
df=54, p=0.244, RMSEA=0.017, CFI=0.987, TLI=0.983) with the addition of the new direct
path (government form>economy) and indirect path specification. Interestingly, while a councilmanager form of government is typically associated with “sound budgeting and accounting
practices” (Levine, Ruin, & Wolohojian, 1981, p. 620), the results here suggest that the
government form is linked to weaker local economic conditions (β= -0.180, p<0.01) and,
indirectly, local police agency fiscal distress (β= 0.100, p<0.01).
A final model was estimated to further explore Levine’s (1978) notion of problem
depletion. In the present study, problem depletion is operationalized as the percent change in
UCR Part I crime rates between 2007 and 2011. We operate under the assumption that police
departments increase their exposure to cutbacks during times of fiscal austerity when the
problems they are designed to handle become less pressing. By accounting for percent change,
we can measure the fluctuations in the magnitude of a jurisdiction’s crime problem over a
relatively short period. Indeed, the results in Models 1 and 2 indicate that departmental distress
is more common in agencies experiencing the greatest drops in crime during the period. Note,
however, that the operationalization only considers the change in crime rates, not the absolute
magnitude of the problem. We estimated the indirect path model a second time (reproducing
Model 2), substituting 2011 crime rates for the percent change in crime rates from 2007-2011.
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As predicted by Levine’s (1978) theory, the absolute magnitude of the problem is less important
than its change over time. The revised model (not shown) does not fit the data as well as Model
1 or 2 (χ2=77.711, df=54, p=0.019, RMSEA=0.032, CFI=0.944, TLI=0.957) and the 2011 crime
rate variable is not a significant predictor of fiscal distress (β= -0.061, p>0.05).

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Our goal in this study was to examine the relationship between environmental indicators
of financial turbulence, structural arrangements of police departments, and fiscal responses by
those agencies to economic hardship. Using Levine’s (1978) organizational decline typology,
we found that both environmental and size variables affect agency responses.
First and foremost, we found that police departments operating within areas where the
economy remained strong were the least likely to experience decline during the Great Recession.
This is intuitive, and on the surface, not something that police agencies have much control over,
however, there are steps that police departments can take to prepare for these inevitable
fluctuations in economic conditions. For example, agencies with more slack resources may be
able to withstand economic turbulence for longer periods of time before actively making
cutbacks. Ironically, this can penalize the most efficient organizations, who tend to use all of
their resources efficiently. Perhaps agencies that are best able to come in under budget can use
some of these slack resources to prepare for potential hardships.
We also found that police departments operating in contexts with rising crime rates were
less likely to make cuts. Where crime rates are high, more officers are needed to address this
problem, both proactively and reactively. With falling crime rates, agencies may be able to
survive with smaller numbers of officers, and some of these agencies may even be absorbed into
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larger agencies (Brunet, 2015). Thus, the response to financial hardship may be influenced by
the demand for the services that the organization provides.
With the exception of organizational size, we did not find evidence of any direct
relationships between our measures of political vulnerability and fiscal distress; however, we did
find that council-manager government forms are less likely to appear in places where the
economy is doing well. This finding was unexpected, but is explainable in that our measure of
economic well-being is linked more closely to individual economics (e.g., housing values,
employment rates) than government resources. It could be that while the economy has improved
broadly, more resources are not necessarily available at local government levels. Alternatively,
the role of city managers may be overstated. Perhaps council-manager governments are not
enough to prevent local economic downturns. However, the presence of a city manager may
allow for “quick and effective retrenchment action” in the face of a recession, adapting more
quickly than other jurisdictions (Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981, p. 626).
Finally, we found that larger agencies, employing more officers were more likely to
experience fiscal distress. These larger departments may be better able to withstand some belttightening by simply asking some of their remaining officers to do more. It is less likely that
larger departments disappear altogether, so in order to remain functional, they might have to look
to measures such as hiring freezes, layoffs, or salary reductions. Larger agencies may be better
situated to survive economic challenges, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t be forced to adapt
(see King, 2014).
Our study was not without limitations. While we merged multiple iterations of the
LEMAS survey together, we were only able to examine our variables cross-sectionally. This is
because the items that appear in the different waves of the LEMAS are not necessarily
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consistent. For example, the 2007 LEMAS survey includes a measure of the number of
substations, which allows for measurement of spatial complexity. The 2013 LEMAS contains no
such measure, so it is not possible to examine changes in this construct across the waves. As
such, a longitudinal examination of police agencies (see King, 2009) using data from the
LEMAS series is quite challenging. Ideally, we could examine whether agencies that have
become more complex experience more financial distress. The answer to this question is not
possible given the data at hand.
We were also lacking some measures that could help us apply Levine’s typology to
police agencies (see Brunet, 2015). Measures of the age of the organizations in our sample, and
whether there was some type of political changeover would help us further develop the political
vulnerability concept, which received only indirect support in our study. Moreover,
organizational-level information regarding retirements, turnover, misconduct, or slack resources
would help examine organizational atrophy more effectively. Even when economic
circumstances are challenging, a large number of retirements and voluntary resignations may
prevent the organization from taking more formal measures such as layoffs or salary reductions.
It is also possible that police departments begin to mirror each other in attempts to
successful address organizational decline and economic turbulence. The literature on
isomorphism among organizations suggests that this process can be coercive when organizations
change due to pressures from larger, more powerful organizations, or it can be mimetic if it
results from one organization imitating another (see Burruss & Giblin, 2014; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). In both cases, police organizations experiencing decline are likely to follow the
lead of those agencies which have provided an effective blue-print for addressing such decline.
We did not have any measures of this potential process.
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In addition to examining the relationship between organizational decline and police
organizational structure longitudinally, future researchers may examine whether a reciprocal
relationship exists between fiscal distress and organizational structure. That is, do agencies that
experience fiscal distress become less complex in the future? Moreover, what long-term effects
might fiscal distress have on police effectiveness and/or police legitimacy? We believe that a
number of policing outcomes may be influenced by the economic stability of the police agency.
To conclude, our study examined how both police organizational structure and
environmental economic conditions affect fiscal decisions by police departments. We found that
both economic conditions, and factors linked to the organizations themselves predict responses.
In a social reality where economic conditions will continuously ebb and flow, it is important that
police agencies have plans in place to adapt to economic turbulence.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for endogenous and exogenous variables
n
m
sd

min.

max.

Economic distress indicators
Salary reductions
Furloughs
Hiring freezes
Layoffs

461
457
462
443

0.085
0.228
0.301
0.059

0.279
0.420
0.459
0.235

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Environmental entropy
indicators
Median home value change
GDP change
Employment rate

461
437
465

-11.172
-1.031
90.993

17.629
1.663
2.034

-54.84
-6.00
83.50

32.40
10.80
96.70

Problem depletion indicator
Crime rate change

442

-16.739

19.122

-96.05

35.90

465

494.865

1872.103

87

35,216

461
461
462

0.568
3.965
5.896

0.496
1.823
2.149

0
0
0

1
7
9

450
462

10.531
14.509

4.663
1.750

0
8

22
17

Political vulnerability indicators
Organizational size (FT
sworn)
Government (councilmanager)
Funding variety
Community policing
Organizational atrophy
indicators
Horizontal complexity
Formalization
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Table 2. Correlation matrix and collinearity statistics for study variables

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Median home value
change
GDP change
Employment rate
Crime rate change
Government form
Funding variety
Community policing
Organizational size (logged)
Horizontal complexity
Formalization
VIF1

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
0.629
0.529
0.034
-0.156
-0.091
-0.110
0.005
-0.102
-0.086

1.000
0.445
0.038
-0.196
-0.044
-0.078
-0.033
-0.135
-0.032

1.000
0.063
-0.114
-0.065
-0.017
-0.028
-0.103
-0.050

1.000
-0.104
-0.030
-0.008
-0.030
-0.004
0.006

1.000
0.048
0.172
-0.180
0.076
0.027

1.000
0.024
0.111
0.160
0.000

1.000
0.153
0.292
0.166

1.000
0.639
0.262

1.000
0.289

1.000

1.94

1.78

1.42

1.02

1.16

1.04

1.13

1.91

1.99

1.11

VIF based on sample of n=391 after listwise deletion.
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Figure 1. Theoretical model of fiscal distress and hypothesized relationships
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Table 3. Fiscal distress and economy measurement model estimates
Fiscal distress
Indicator

Economy
Item loading

Indicator

Item loading

Salary reductions

0.828

Median home value
change

Furloughs

0.759

GDP change

0.712

Hiring freezes

0.399

Employment rate

0.623

Layoffs

0.355

0.877

χ2=10.387, df=13, p=0.662, RMSEA=0.000, CFI=1.000, TLI=1.008
Fiscal distress/Economy R = -0.552

Table 4. Estimates and fit indices for fiscal distress structural model1
Model 1

Model 2
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β

S.E.

β

S.E.

Environmental entropy
Economy (unobserved latent)

-0.544***

0.064

-0.555***

0.065

Problem depletion
Crime rate change

-0.129*

0.064

-0.129*

0.064

Political vulnerability
Government form
Funding variety
Community policing
Organizational size (FT sworn)

0.084
0.023
-0.072
0.240*

0.081
0.077
0.076
0.098

-0.016
0.023
-0.072
0.240*

0.077
0.077
0.076
0.098

Organizational atrophy
Horizontal complexity
Formalization

0.186
-0.055

0.102
0.085

0.186
-0.055

0.102
0.085

Government form>economy

-0.180**

0.061

Government form>economy>fiscal distress
(indirect)

0.100**

0.036

n
2

χ
df
p
RMSEA
TLI
CFI
Fiscal distress R2

419

419

73.898
55
0.045
0.029
0.953
0.963

60.811
54
0.244
0.017
0.983
0.987

0.453

0.455

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<.05
1

1

Measurement model parameters omitted.

As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, it is possible that certain agencies (e.g., more complex agencies) may be
more likely to utilize non-sworn personnel, who may serve as specialists or experts. Cutting these employees
would likely have a different effect than cutting other officers who may lack this level of expertise. Unfortunately,
the nature of our dependent variables does not allow us to make this distinction.
2
The LEMAS dataset includes indicators that would capture the depth of the decline for both sworn and nonsworn personnel (e.g., the percent of the salary reduction, the duration of the hiring freeze, the number of
individuals experiencing layoffs or furloughs). We employ “presence” indicators given the highly skewed nature of
the variable. For example, 95% of agencies did not furlough any sworn personnel but 12 (<3%) furloughed more
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than 90% of sworn employees. Given this distribution, a binary indicator proved sufficient to capture the existence
of fiscal distress, particularly when the four indicators are combined into a single latent construct.
3
Although we computed percent change scores for GDP and housing prices, we used only the 2011 unemployment
rates. GDP and housing prices are influenced by factors (e.g., cost of living, size of industry) that make direct
comparison across areas difficult. Thus, percent change scores are used instead. In contrast, unemployment rates
are more directly comparable across areas; a single year’s unemployment rate provides a useful indication of the
state of the local economy.
4
Problems/tasks included auto theft, bias/hate crime, bomb/explosive disposal, child abuse/endangerment,
community crime prevention, crime analysis, cybercrime, domestic violence, drug education in schools, financial
crimes, drug enforcement, gangs, impaired drivers, internal affairs, juvenile crime, methamphetamine labs, missing
children, repeat offenders, research and planning, school safety, terrorism/homeland security, and victim
assistance.
5
Areas include deadly force/firearm discharge, use of less-than-lethal force, code of conduct and appearance, offduty employment, maximum work hours, off-duty conduct, interacting with the media, employee counseling
assistance, mentally ill persons, homeless persons, domestic disputes, juveniles, persons with limited English
proficiency, collection of information on in-custody deaths, racial profiling, citizen complaints, and checking of
immigration status by patrol officers.
6
Incidentally, we also tested a model with five, rather than four, indicators of fiscal distress. The additional item—
restrictions on overtime—was also available in the LEMAS 2013 dataset. Although the fit statistics for this
expanded model were also within acceptable ranges (χ2=21.267, df=19, p=0.322, RMSEA=0.000, CFI=0.996,
TLI=0.994), the overall model was inferior to the four-indicator fiscal distress version. Additionally, the overtime
factor loading was negative, suggesting that it did not fit with the other fiscal distress indicators.
7
Mplus uses multiple imputation when performing analyses to maximize sample size. Although we report the
imputed models, we also performed all analyses using listwise deletion (resulting in a sample size of approximately
369 agencies per model. Fit statistics changed slightly as did coefficient estimates but the significant parameters
remained unchanged. Therefore, we omitted reporting the analyses using listwise deletion.

